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and
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Introduction
This work examines the leverage ratios of firms covered by the 1998 SSBF Survey. We 
find that small firms in general are significantly more levered than their larger counterparts in 
an industry-matched Compustat sample, but the difference is at least partially explained by 
differences in industry distributions of the two samples. Our regression results provide some 
interesting contrasts to previous studies. In examining the effects of relationship banking on 
deviations from industry leverage norms, we find that a close banking relationship is related to 
a lower leverage, even after controlling for industry medians, and also that firms with a closer 
primary banking relationship adhere more closely to industry norms. Counter to previous 
research, we also find that small business leverage is negatively correlated with total assets.
While the field of empirical capital structure studies is very actively researched, the 
large majority of studies have been conducted on samples of large firms. The relative shortage
 ^ *The authors would like to thank Kent Hickman, Tim Michael, Ted Moore, Mark Shrader, Rassoul Yazdipour 
(special issue editor), two anonymous referees, and participants at the 2006 Academy o f Entrepreneurial Finance 
annual conference for helpful comments and suggestions
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of research into private small firm capital structure is troubling because small firms provide 
about half of private sector employment and produce about half of private sector output in the 
United States (Vinturella and Erickson, 2004). Even their aggregate importance as users of 
financing has recently surpassed that of better-known large-firm markets (Denis, 2004).
Small firms face a very different financial market compared to large public firms. Due 
to the dominance of private equity financing and bank lending in the field, small business 
owners face less competitive, perhaps less informationally efficient, and therefore more 
restrictive financial markets (Berger and Udell, 1998).
This study examines capital structure decisions in a small and medium enterprise (SME) 
setting. Specifically, we look at two main issues. First, we test whether industry median 
leverage, which has been found to affect large firm capital structure decisions (e.g. 
Hovakimian, 2004), also guide financing patterns of SMEs. This adherence to industry norms 
could be explained either by industry-specific variation in ability (and willingness) to carry 
debt, or, especially in small business setting, by financiers’ use of industry medians as a 
guideline in their lending decisions. We find that while SMEs in general are more levered than 
larger firms, at least some of that difference is explained by SMEs being in industries that tend 
to use more leverage. SME capital structure is strongly affected by median industry leverage 
obtained from Compustat.
Second, we study the effects that the geographic proximity of the firm’s banking 
relationship has on its use of financial leverage. Recent research (Brick, et.al., 2004, Berger and 
Udell, 2002, Berger, et.al., 2005) suggests that in small business lending, that is dominated by 
bank lending, smaller banks that are geographically closer to their customer firms are better 
able to use “soft” qualitative information about their customers’ credit quality^ Since industry 
ratios represent “hard” information often used by lenders, we expect banks with a closer 
relationship to their customers to deviate more from industry norms when making lending 
decisions. Moreover, we expect that the soft information and the closeness of the relationship 
between the bank and the firm allows the bank to extend credit more readily to the firm. Our 
findings are surprising. First, controlling for industry medians from Compustat, we find that 
SME leverage is positively related to the distance from the firm’s main bank, and negatively 
related to the duration of the firm’s relationship with their main bank. Also, firms that only use 
one bank tend to be less levered. Second, our evidence suggests that firms with a longer 
primary banking relationship deviate less from their industry medians. This is counter to the 
argument that the soft information produced by a close banking relationship allows for more 
“tailor-made” lending.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we provide a short summary 
of the existing literature on the differences between small and large businesses, especially with 
regards to capital structure decisions. In Section II, we introduce our data sources, and in 
Section III, we present our findings. Section IV concludes.
L What is different about SMEs?
Numerous authors argue that small firms are not simply large firms scaled down (e.g. 
Scherr and Hulburt, 2001, Welsch and White, 1981). It is likely that there are issues specific to 
smaller firms that make it necessary to consider them as a different class of firms when
 ^Berger and Udell (2004) list the character and reliability o f  the entrepreneur, and past financial performance 
gathered from transaction history with the institution and from communications with the entrepreneur's suppliers, 
customers, and neighbors, as examples o f  soft information.
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examining capital structure decisions. For example, SMEs typically have greater growth 
options, shorter asset maturities, occupy different industry sectors, and exhibit higher failure 
rates than larger firms (Scherr and Hulburt, 2001, Diamond, 1991). Also, their small size and 
difficulties in attracting external financing may make entrepreneurs’ personal wealth an 
important factor (Stafford, el al., 1999).
In response to these issues, a limited body of literature examining SME capital structure 
has developed recently. Ang, et.al.’s (2000) findings support the idea that large ownership 
interest held by the entrepreneur reduces the agency costs of raising capital. Hall, et.al. (2000) 
find support for the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) in the study using a large UK sample. 
According to their results, SME capital structure is affected not only by firm size, age, and 
profitability, but also by its industry. Petersen and Raj an’s (1994) results suggest that close 
geographical relationships to financiers increase availability of financing, and also reduce its 
cost. However, in a more recent study, Petersen and Raj an (2002) report that the importance of 
closeness may be decreasing as technology is allowing more effective data analysis and easier 
access, even at greater distances. Local banking competition is also likely to affect the cost 
benefit of the close distance. Degryse and Ongena (2005) find evidence of spatial price 
discrimination in small business lending in Belgium. In their study, the cost of financing 
decreases with distance to the lender, but is also increases with distance to competing banks. 
The effect of entrepreneur’s wealth has not received much empirical support. Tanewski, et al. 
(2000) find that family businesses behave similarly to non-family SMEs with regard to capital 
structure. Similarly, Rutherford, et al. (2006) find only a weak correlation between family net 
worth and capital structure.
A. More severe information asymmetry (supply side)
Perhaps the most heavily investigated difference between large and small firm capital 
structures is in the area of incomplete or asymmetric information. The conditions arising from 
informational asymmetries manifest themselves as the related concepts of adverse selection, 
information opacity, and moral hazard. Adverse selection describes a situation where a high 
quality firm may not be able to attain funding simply because the financier is unable to discern 
its quality (Akerlof, 1970). Because of opaqueness of SMEs, investors may be unable to detect 
entrepreneurs’ behavior, resulting in the moral hazard. The related “costly state verification” 
problem further increases the perceived risk of SME investing.
Berger and Udell (2002) and others suggest that more severe information asymmetry 
among SMEs could lead to pecking order behavior because outside financiers, in order to make 
up for the increased risk caused by poor information and the inability to monitor the 
entrepreneur’s behavior, will demand higher return rates. Thus, SME owners will prefer 
internal financing over external financing. Once internal sources are exhausted, the preferred 
solution to the information asymmetry problem is to apply for a loan with a bank with which 
the firm has an existing banking relationship. These issues are thought to soften with age and 
size, as the firm generates greater evidence and a greater ability to clearly communicate its 
quality.
B. SME owner’s/manager’s demand for control (demand side)
Another line of literature suggests that a corporate strategy perspective (i.e. owner’s 
goals, preferences, and relationships) rather than a finance perspective (i.e. wealth 
maximization) may help in understanding private SME capital structure (Barton and Gordon,
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1987; Chaganti, et al. 1995; Barton and Matthews; 1989). SME’s capital structure decisions 
may often be made by the owner/manager with little credence given to the current capital 
market or industry conditions.
Barton and Matthews (1989) submit that the entrepreneur’s characteristics and goals 
play a more important role than targeting an optimal debt level. In smaller firms, owner- 
managers control the majority stake in the firm and often prefer to retain that control (Scherr 
and Hulburt, 2001). While the individual characteristics of entrepreneurs are not yet well 
understood—and beyond the scope of this work—it is important to understand that ‘ulterior’ 
motives may exist for SMEs owners making the financing decisions. These motives provide a 
demand side motivation for pecking order, as it supports the desire to keep control of the firm. 
This results in a preference of internal equity to external financing sources and external debt 
over external equity, regardless of wealth maximization implications.
C. SME financing sources
The sources of SME financing differ significantly from those of large, publicly traded 
firms. On the debt side, banks dominate. The equity of small businesses often initially comes 
from the entrepreneur, and in later stages from angel investors and venture capital firms. While 
the difference in institutions between large and small businesses can be seen as a response to 
the information asymmetry and the entrepreneur characteristics discussed above, the 
institutional differences themselves could also cause capital structures of small firms to deviate 
from those of their larger counterparts.
Relationship banking has attracted a lot of recent research interest. Berger and Udell 
(2002) and Berger, et.al. (2005) suggest that closer ties between the bank and its customer 
allow the bank to “customize” its financing package. Also, in relationship banking, the bank is 
able to factor “soft” information about the customer’s credit worthiness into its lending 
decisions. This soft information could allow banks to extend credit even in cases when such a 
decision would not be warranted by the available hard information. The counter-argument is 
that in a close banking relationship, the lender may take on a stronger fiduciary duty, perhaps 
even for non-monetary reasons, and therefore would curtail the borrowing of the SME 
customer. Among large firms, Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) find that bankers tend to limit 
borrowing when they act as board members. Observed capital structure patterns could also be 
influenced by the easier access to debt financing in relationship banking. If the firm can borrow 
when needed, the observed leverage could be lower than it is for firms with a more difficult 
access to debt financing.
II. Data
Our sample comes from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF). The 
SSBF conducted the survey during 1998-2000 for the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. The target population was all for-profit, non-financial, non-farm, non­
subsidiary business enterprises that had fewer than 500 employees and were in operation as of 
the year-end of 1998. The sample was drawn from firms listed on the Dun’s Market Identifier 
file as of November 1993. Businesses were contacted in advance of the survey to determine 
eligibility, verify addresses, and identify a contact person. Not all businesses met the target- 
population definition, some businesses could not be contacted, and others were determined to 
have erroneous frame data. The overall eligibility rate of sampled businesses was about 60 
percent. Each business meeting the eligibility criteria was sent an advance work sheet to
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encourage the use of written records in responding to the subsequent computer assisted 
interviews. Interviews were conducted by the National Opinion Research Center and averaged 
42 minutes in length.
A total of 3,561 firms are included in this public use data set. The firms included in the sample 
represent 5.3 million small businesses as defined by the Small Business Administration general 
guidelines as firms having less than 500 employees.
Out of the 3,561 firms covered by the 1998 SSBF survey, we exclude financial firms 
(SIC code between 6000 and 6999) and firms that report a negative amount for either Total 
Debt (item si) or Total Assets (item rl2). After defining our main variable of interest 
(LEVERAGE) as Total Debt / Total Assets, we also exclude firms that report LEVERAGE 
greater than one. This leaves us with a sample of 1,812 firms. As a control group we use the 
COMPUSTAT universe, broken down to industries by the primary two-digit SIC code.
In Table I, we provide some descriptive statistics for our sample. Overall, leverage in 
our filtered data (35.84%) is significantly lower than that reported by Berger and Udell (1998) 
(50.37%). Their study is based on the 1993 NSSBF survey. Besides differences in firm and/or 
industry distribution of respondents, also differences in capital market conditions and even 
differences in survey procedures may explain the observed difference in leverage. Our sub­
category results are also somewhat conflicting to the 1993 survey results of the identically 
identified sub-categories. When we define large firms in accordance with Berger and Udell’s 
(1998) definition as firms with more than 20 employees and more than $1 million in sales, we 
find larger firms to be less levered, whereas in their paper, larger firms were more levered 
(52.33% ) than small firms (44.00%).^ Our age-dependent leverage distribution agrees with 
Berger and Udell’s (1998) results as younger firms are more levered than more seasoned firms.
III. Analysis and Results
We begin our analysis by comparing our small business sample to the COMPUSTAT 
universe by two-digit SIC code. Our choice of comparing small business leverage to that of 
larger counterparts in the same industry is based on previous findings that optimal capital 
structure (or firms’ ability to carry debt) is at least to some extent industry-related (e.g. Bradley, 
Jarrell, and Kim, 1984). Besides industry medians, Hovakimian (2004) also uses fitted values 
from cross-sectional regressions using explanatory accounting and stock-based variables to 
determine an alternative proxy for target capital structure. Unfortunately, our data source does 
not allow use of such an alternative in this study.^
In Table II, we report the median leverage ratios (measured as total debt/total assets) for 
each two-digit SIC code represented. In contrast to Faulkender (2002) who reports significant 
differences in cash holdings between the 1998 SSBF survey and COMPUSTAT, we find that 
the leverage ratios of small businesses conform relatively closely with those of their respective 
COMPUSTAT industry groups. Out of the 55 two-digit SIC codes represented, for 14 
industries the median leverage of small businesses is different from the COMPUSTAT firms’ 
leverage at the 10 percent level of significance."  ^ In nine of the industries, the small business
 ^The marked differences between our descriptive statistics and those o f  Berger and Udell (1998) suggest that 
comparing the capital structure patterns in 1993 and 1998 surveys is an interesting area o f further study.
 ^ Out o f the eight determinants o f  target leverage, SSBF accounting data would only allow use o f three, and even 
those three would give only “rough” estimates compared to Hovakimian’s (2004) data set.
Due to small sample sizes in many industries, we focus our analysis on the Medians test, while we also report t- 
statistics o f  a Means test in Table II.
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leverage is higher than that of the larger firms as indicated by a Z-test of medians, and in five 
industries, the median small business leverage is lower than that of their larger counterparts. 
Therefore, one could posit that deviations from industry medians are due to chance rather than 
SMEs being different from the firms in COMPUSTAT.^
The ability to raise both equity and debt funding, and also the availability of retained 
earnings, is likely to differ between large firms and small firms (Berger and Udell, 1998). Any 
differences in leverage between small and large businesses could thus be in part attributable to 
the business size difference between the two groups. In the second column of Table II, we only 
include the smallest quartile (measured by book value of assets) of COMPUSTAT firms in 
each two-digit SIC code. When compared to only small COMPUSTAT firms, the small 
businesses in eight out of the 55 industries have median leverage higher than that of the 
COMPUSTAT firms, and none of the industries has a higher median leverage than that of the 
COMPUSTAT firms at the 10 percent level. The fact that in most of the industries included in 
our analysis the leverage of small businesses appears to follow the industry norms provides at 
least anecdotal support for existence of industry-specific target capital structures.
In Table III, we provide regression results on determinants of small business leverage, 
with the leverage ratio serving as the dependent variable in each regression. In column (a), 
besides the test variable INDLEV (median leverage of the industry-control group from 
COMPUSTAT), we include control variables for firm size [log(assets) and log(sales)]. In order 
to control for agency costs, we also include the control variables for percentage of ownership 
retained by the principle owner, and firm age (log(firm age in years)), used and motivated by 
Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000). As discussed above, the percentage of ownership retained by the 
principle owner is also an important measure of entrepreneur characteristics potentially driving 
the capital structure decision. Log(net worth) controls for entrepreneur’s net worth having 
effect on capital structure. Our last control variable, college education, takes on value of one for 
entrepreneurs that are college educated, and zero otherwise. With that variable, we control for 
potentially more educated financing decisions that college-educated owners might make.
Our test variable INDLEV enters with a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting 
a role for industry norms in capital structure choices by small businesses. Our control variables 
provide further insights into the determinants of use of debt financing among small businesses. 
Surprisingly, total assets enter with a negative and significant sign, suggesting, counter to 
previous findings, that larger firms with typically more collateralizable assets actually use less 
debt fmancing. For example, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find the same variable to positively 
affect leverage in their small firm data set. As Table II indicated a tendency of the larger 
COMPUSTAT firms to use less leverage than the much smaller SSBF firms, it is interesting to 
note that we observe the same tendency even within the small firm sample. Some of the firm 
size effect may also be captured by sales, which is positively related to leverage. Column (a) 
further indicates a weak negative relation between ownership share and leverage. Firm age is 
strongly inversely related to leverage. This conflicts with Berger and Udell’s (1998) financial 
growth cycle of small business that suggests that the initial small business fmancing often 
comes in the form of insider equity fmancing. The coefficients for college education and net 
worth are insignificant. Profitability could also affect leverage, as higher profits increase 
availability of internal equity. However, inclusion of profitability measures leaves our findings 
intact, while severely reducing the sample size (results not reported).
 ^The industries in which capital structures differ at 1% level are 15 -  Building Construction, General Contractors 
and Operative Builders, 73 -  Business Services, and 80 -  Health Services.
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Column (b) of Table III confirms that our results are similar when we replace the 
leverage measure that controls for industry-related effects with a set of dummy variables 
representing each two-digit SIC code, with SIC26 serving as a control group. Out of the 54 SIC 
code groups, 14 exhibit an effect on leverage that is significant at the 10 percent level or better. 
Interestingly, in contrast to Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) who find a set of industry dummies 
alone to describe over 50% of the variation in leverage of large firms, our model with 54 
dummy variables and six control variables has an R-squared of only 8.29% and an adjusted R- 
squared of 5.18%. The low R-squared values in all of the regressions in Table 3 are most likely 
a result of the smallest firms in the sample exhibiting more “random” patterns in their capital 
structure decisions. Indeed, if we only include the largest quartile of the SSBF sample in the 
regression, the adjusted R-squared of the specification in column (a) increases to 8.8%, and in 
that sample, the dummy variables alone have an R-squared of 19.2% and an adjusted R-squared 
of 8.2%. The coefficients and the t-statistics are very similar to the full sample results reported 
in Table 3 (results not reported).^
In column (c), we repeat the main model fi*om column (a) without log(sales). No large 
changes to column (a) are observed. The negative coefficient on log(assets) becomes weaker. 
However, the findings regarding log(assets) and INDLEV are similar to column (a) when all 
other independent variables are excluded in column (d) of Table III. While our findings suggest 
that industry capital structure standards play a role in financing decisions among small 
businesses, we are unable to detect consistent evidence of any economic incentives for small 
businesses to align their capital structures with those of larger firms within their industry 
(results not reported).
Next, we consider the effects of a close banking relationship on small business leverage. 
While we are imable to identify each bank and subsequently use bank-specific information like 
Berger, et.al. (2005) do in their study that uses the 1993 NSSBF survey data, we define three 
proxies for closeness of the banking relationship. The summary statistics of these proxies are 
reported in Panel A of Table IV. The 1998 SSBF dataset indicates the geographical distance 
that the firm has to each of the financial institutions it uses, and also how long the firm has been 
a customer with each institution. The respondents also indicate their primary banking 
relationship. The sample mean distance to the primary institution is 24.5 miles, and the median 
is two miles. In our subsequent analysis, we define “Long distance” as a dummy variable that 
takes on the value of one if the primary bank is further than ten miles away. Our expectation is 
that banks that are geographically closer have a closer relationship with their customers. The 
mean duration of a banking relationship is over eight years, and the median is five years. Our 
variable “Long relationship” takes on the value of one if the primary banking relationship has 
lasted for five years or more. We expect that a longer relationship would also be a closer one. 
Finally we use a dummy variable “one bank” that indicates firms that only used a single bank. 
19.1% of the sample receives this dummy variable.
Most of the literature on relationship banking posits that a close banking relationship 
allows the use of more informal soft data in funding decisions (e.g. Berger and Udell, 2002). 
Duration of the banking relationship (Dell’Ariccia, 2001), exclusivity (Berger, et al. 2001) and 
distance (Hausman and Marquez, 2005; Berger, et al., 2005; and others) have been proposed as 
factors alleviating agency problems in small business lending. Thus, we might expect to 
observe higher leverage among firms with close banking relationships. Also, if we were to 
explain the adherence to industry norms reported in Tables 2 and 3 as evidence of financing
 ^We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
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providers using hard data such as industry medians when making their lending decisions, we 
should expect that with closer banking relationships, we would see more deviations from the 
industry norms. In Panel B of Table IV, we compare leverage and industry-adjusted leverage of 
firms with a close banking relationship to that of firms with a distant banking relationship, 
using each of our three proxies. The t-statistics of each comparison are reported in the 
parentheses. While the leverage of firms using one bank is indistinguishable from the leverage 
of firms using several institutions, our other two proxies indicate significant results. 
Surprisingly, firms whose primary institution is within ten miles and firms with a primary 
banking relationship beyond five years are less levered, both in absolute terms and after 
controlling for industry medians. Firms with a long primary banking relationship also have a 
lower absolute deviation from industry medians, which is equally surprising if we were to 
assume that a longer banking relationship would allow more “tailor-made” lending.
In the first three columns of Table V, we report regression results where DIF (Leverage
-  industry median leverage) is used as the dependent variable. Besides the independent 
variables used in Table III, we include each of our banking relationship variables in their own 
specification.
Regardless of whether we measure the closeness of the primary banking relationship by 
geographic distance, duration, or exclusivity, we find that a closer banking relationship is 
connected with lower industry-adjusted leverage. The finding regarding the duration of the 
banking relationship is even more surprising given Table I evidence that old firms are generally 
less levered.
Our evidence of a negative relation between close banking relationship and leverage 
suggests either that the soft information is systematically negative, or at least that it does not 
allow the banks to extend more credit. Petersen and Raj an (1994) posit that larger, and perhaps 
more distant banks may possess a competitive advantage in information production due to scale 
economies. In other words, while more distant banks may not have access to soft information, 
they have a better capability to assess hard information. Petersen and Raj an’s (1994, 2002) 
finding that lending distance is inversely related to loan rates fits that notion. Our results 
provide further support for it. Also, as the banks indicated in Table V as relationship banks are 
likely to represent smaller banks^, they may not be as well-prepared to extend loans that would 
put their customers into default risk as larger, more diversified banks^. The lower leverage 
amongst firms with close banking relationships could also be explained by the ease of access 
that those firms have to additional financing. In the language of Myers (1984), those firms’ cost 
of adjustment is very low, so instead of borrowing to have financial slack, they maintain a close 
banking relationship to retain additional borrowing capacity. Furthermore, soft information and 
close relationship could lead the bankers to take on a fiduciary duty similar to bankers on 
boards (Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005), and make them more concerned about their customers’ 
potential default. Regardless, these findings contrast with numerous theoretical studies, and 
warrant further inquiry.
In the last four columns of Table V, the dependent variable is the absolute deviation 
from the COMPUSTAT industry median. While other indicators of closeness of banking 
relationship are insignificant in determining deviations from industry norms, the indicator for 
banking relationship length is weakly negative. When only large firms with 20 or more
 ^Berger, et al. (2005) find that size o f the bank is negatively correlated with its distance from the SME customers. 
 ^Also consistent with this line o f reasoning, Berger, et al.’s (2001) evidence suggests that small firms are likely to 
diversify their lending practices to several banks when their main bank faces financial trouble.
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employees and over $1 million in sales are included in the last column of Table V, the negative 
sign on banking relationship length retains a negative and significant sign. The negative 
correlation between the length of primary banking relationship and dispersion of leverage 
around the industry median is also unexpected, as we would expect soft data in a close banking 
relationship to produce more deviations from industry norms, not less.
IV- Conclusion
We focus on the capital structure of SMEs and test the effect of industry averages on 
them. Based on our results, we conclude that SMEs tend to adhere to a target capital structure 
defined as industry median.
Because of the limited access to the financial market, SMEs face a constrained market 
that may determine and form the capital structure of SMEs to some degree. In practice 
financiers must discern the quality of SMEs before they approve any financing, however 
asymmetric information and costly state verification make it difficult. Financiers often 
consider the comparison between the leverage of small business applicants and that of the 
publicly traded companies within the same industry as a useftil method to evaluate the risk 
level of SMEs.
To take the idea of externally-determined leverage further, we examine whether close 
banking relationships lead to a weaker adherence to industry norms. Contradictory to our 
expectations, we find that SMEs with a close banking relationship use less debt in their 
financing. We also find that the leverage ratios of firms that have a closer primary banking 
relationship are less dispersed with respect to the industry norms. These findings contrast with 
some of the literature on relationship banking, and warrant ftirther study.
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Table I 
Summary Statistics
Panel A reports statistics for the full sample. Leverage is calculated as total debt over total 
assets. Panel B indicates the same leverage measure for different size and age categories.
Panel A: Full Sample
Leverage 
Total Assets 
Sales 
Employees
Mean
0.3584
$2,422,119
$5,607,157
39.55
Panel B: Leverage by sub-categories
Mean
Snnall 0.3770
(<20 employees, <$1 mill, sales)
Large 0.3380
(>19 employees, >$1 mill, sales)
Age<3 years 
Age=3-4 years 
Age=5-24 years 
Age>24 years
0.4503
0.4153
0.3553
0.3078
Median 
0.3075 
$ 325,700 
$ 753,269 
10
Median
0.3156
0.2888
0.4302
0.4162
0.3039
0.2399
N
913
665
99
199
1179
330
35
Table II
Large firm versus Small firm median leverage by industry
Bold Z-statistics indicate statistical significance at the ten percent level or better. Compustat column includes all firms in the Compustat database for each SIC
SIC Compustat SMEs t Z Small T Z SIC Compustat SMEs t Z Small t Z
12 0.2534
n=10
0.5098
n=1
-0.91 -1.10 0.5916 0.46 0.71 45 0.3054
n=59
0.3726
n=5
-0,61 -0.46 0.304 -0.39 -0.64
13 0.3731
n=223
0.1299
n=4
2.17 2.00 0.2895 1.44 0.99 47 0.1817
n=31
0.3735
n=10
-1.57 -0.81 0.1321 -2.24 -1.24
14 0.2838
n=19
0.4145
n=1
-0.79 -1.00 0.233 -0.68 -1.22 48 0.3940
n=364
0.3488
n=13
1.15 0.27 0.2835 -0.10 -0.89
15 0.4408
n=51
0.2350
n=56
3.16 2.60 0.3704 1.26 1.26 49 0.3761
n=285
0.3816
n=4
-0.37 -0.01 0.3199 -1.02 -0.03
16 0.2095
n=26
0.3710
n=17
-2.01 -1.66 0.2095 -2.43 -1.74 50 0.2966
n=215
0.2728
n=103
-0.75 0.60 0.3028 -0.43 0.17
17 0.2253
n=29
0.2310
n=122
-0.85 -0.17 0.1677 -4.92 -2.69 51 0.3109
n=120
0.2871
n=52
-0.16 0.66 0.2623 -0.18 -0.46
20 0.2970
n=184
0.1307
n=14
0.61 1.11 0.2373 -0.07 0.61 52 0.2576
n=18
0.2441
n=25
-0.09 0.13 0.3539 0.77 1.13
22 0.4267
n=45
0.4687
n=4
-0.22 -1.08 0.3904 -0.08 -0.15 53 0.2498
n=44
0.1341
n=4
-0.01 1.03 0.1055 -0.64 -0.15
23 0.2308
n=71
0.3629
n=15
-1.84 -1.41 0.2502 -1.10 -1.05 54 0.3968
n=51
0.3629
n=48
0.27 0.70 0.3686 -0.79 0.00
24 0.3094
n=37
0.4274
n=19
-0.97 -1.40 0.2761 -1.50 -1.99 55 0.4616
n=32
0.5161
n=63
-1.73 -1.65 0.4669 -1.24 -2.19
25 0.2305
n=47
0.3914
n=9
-2.26 -1.80 0.0991 -1.89 -1.31 56 0.1641
n=48
0.2234
n=19
-2.20 -1.96 0.1776 -1.50 -0.59
26 0.3523
n=90
0.4524
n=8
-0.64 -0.73 0.2736 -2.02 -0.81 57 0.2142
n=37
0.2884
n=48
-2.25 -1.86 0.1392 -1.37 -1.02
27 0.3026
n=101
0.3633
n=36
-1.43 -1.21 0.2975 -1.13 -1.19 58 0.3040
n=131
0.3407
n=90
-2.03 -1.15 0.3152 -1.45 -0.41
28 0.1905
n=516
0.3902
n=7
-1.78 -1.91 0.1307 -1.82 -1.93 59 0.2184
n=159
0.2985
n=97
-2.90 -1.41 0.1425 -3.56 -2.46
29 0.2630
n=50
0.5956
n=1
-1.71 -1.02 0.2759 -1.03 -1.08 70 0.4996
n=38
0.3565
n=22
1.18 1.59 0.4888 0.65 0.50
30 0.3705
n=91
0.2975
n=15
0.85 0.28 0.281 -0.05 -0.46 72 0.2925
n=17
0.2482
n=40
-0.54 0.37 0.1064 -1.11 -1.04
31 0.2184
n=24
0.1425
n=5
0.28 0.40 0.2238 0.35 0.32 73 0.1175
n=987
0.2804
n=158
-6.92 -7.21 0.13 -5.20 -4.68
32 0.2996
n=47
0.3954
n=12
-0.59 -1.35 0.2619 -1.53 -1.03 75 0.5784
n=17
0.3064
n=51
2.48 2.50 0.5101 1.04 0.04
33 0.3160
n=125
0.3051
n=4
0.05 0.02 0.3193 0.13 0.06 76 0.4484
n=7
0.3454
n=33
0.28 1.23 0.0467 -1.07 -1.00
34 0.3199
n=124
0.3439
n=26
-1.32 0.00 0.2111 -2.83 -0.65 78 0.2914
n=72
0.3246
n=8
-0.45 -0.74 0.2402 -0.88 -0.83
35 0.2108
n=458
0.2149
n=31
-1.60 -0.57 0.2303 -0.64 0.56 79 0.4531
n=90
0.3151
n=28
2.27 1.72 0.3778 0.73 0.56
36 0.1895
n=544
0.3735
n=21
-2.63 -1.56 0.1981 -2.40 -1.20 80 0.3795
n=139
0.2482
n=86
1.81 3.51 0.3219 0.87 1.61
37 0.3099
n=153
0.1419
n=8
1.11 1.43 0.3462 1.16 1.54 81 0.0539
n=3
0.2221
n=50
-1.51 -1.73 #N/A
38 0.1666
n=405
0.2366
n=9
-1.57 -1.68 0.1568 -0.65 -1.73 82 0.1702
n=23
0.2115
n=9
-0.21 -0.39 0.057 -1.53 -0.54
39 0.2950
n=81
0.4673
n=17
-1.27 -0.80 0.2493 -2.35 -1.78 83 0.5141
n=19
0.4772
n=24
0.46 1.04 0.3387 -0.64 -1.06
41 0.4046
n=6
0.4247
n=7
-1.16 -0.25 0.4322 -0.30 1.00 87 0.1895
n=173
0.2428
n=118
-3.46 -1.48 0.2106 -1.55 -0.49
42 0.3297
n=58
0.5472
n=31
-2.97 -2.07 0.4573 -0.96 -1.17 99 0.1429
n=17
0.3406
n=2
-0.32 -0.08 0.2241 -0.27 0.00
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Table
The table reports OLS results. INDLEV is the median leverage in Connpustat for the two-digit SIC code, 
Principle Ownership is the percentage of common stock held by the principle owner, Log(net worth) is 
the log of entrepreneur's net worth, Finn Age is the age of the fimri in years, and College Education is a 
dummy variable taking on the value of one for firms with a college-educated principle owner. In column 
(b), indicator variables are included for each SIC code represented, except for SIC 26 (coefficients not 
reported). The t-statistics (in parentheses) have been obtained using White (1980) standard errors. 
Significance at the ten-, five-, and one-percent level is indicated by *, **, and ***
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d)
constant 0.4897*** 0.6684*** 0.5596*** 0.4601***
Log(assets)
(7.420)
-0.0237***
(9.438)
-0.0264***
(8.838)
-0.0069
(10.747)
-0.0118***
Log(sales)
(-3.637)
0.0213***
(-4.015)
0.0145**
(-1.578) (-3.820)
Industry Leverage 
(INDLEV)
(3.431)
0.2070***
(2.365)
0.1870*** 0.1652***
Principle Ownership
(3.860)
-0.0306 -0.0444*
(3.514)
-0.0433*
(3.156)
Log(net worth)
(-1.248) 
-0.0050
(-1.830)
-0.0019
(-1.798) 
-0.0032
Firm Age
(-1.046)
-0.0430***
(-0.409)
-0.0356***
(-0.677)
-0.0433***
College Education
(-5.287)
0.0074
(-4.499)
0.0177
(-5.304)
0.0082
Industry Dummies
(0.559) (1.301)
14/54W /
p<.10
(0.618)
N 1636 1734 1645 1711
Adjusted 0.0365 0.0525 0.0319 0.0122
44 0.4419 0.3988 0.24 1.00 0.3067 0.05 1.00 total 0.2666 0.3069 -8.68 -3.86 0.2284 -9.06 -6.74
n=31 n=1 n=7814 n=1812
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Table IV
Banking Relationship and Leverage Statistics
Panel B indicates the mean leverage for close versus distant banking relationship firms, using geographic distance, duration, and exclusivity as proxies 
for closeness. The t-statistics of a means test are reported In parentheses.
Panel A: Banking relationship indicators
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Distance to primary institution (nniles) 24.45 2.00 150.00 0.00 2506.00
Duration of primary banking relationship (months) 97.40 60.00 98.46 0.00 720.00
Firms with single banking relationship 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00
Panel B: Effect of banking relationship indicators on leverage
Leverage Leverage - industry med. [Leverage - industry med
distance>10 0.3851 0.1003 0.227
distance<11 0.3525 0.0618 0.228
(-1.96) (-2.11) (0.09)
duration>59 0.3373 0.0439 0.2173
duration<60 0.384 0.0992 0.2413
(3.77) (4.05) (2.75)
onebank=1 0.3492 0.049 0.2451
onebank=0 0.3598 0.0726 0.2238
(0.68) (1.27) (-1.84)
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Table V
The table reports OLS results. Principle Ownership is the percentage of common stock held by the principle owner, Log(net worth) is the log of 
entrepreneur's net worth, Firm Age is the age of the fimn in years, and College Education is a dummy variable taking on the value of one for 
finris with a college-educated principle owner. Long distance is an indicator variable for firms located further than 10 miles from their primary 
bank. Long relationship is an indicator variable for firms with a longer than 60 month primary banking relationship. One bank is an indicator 
variable for firms with a single banking relationship. In the first three columns, the dependent variable is DIF = leverage - Compustat industry 
median. In the last four columns, the dependent variable is the square root of DIF^. The last column only includes SSBF 1998 database finns 
with more than 20 employees and more than $1 million in assets. The t-statistics (in parentheses) have been obtained using White (1980) 
standard errors. Significance at the ten-, five-, and one-percent level is indicated by *, **, and ***
Variables DIF DIF DIF ABSDIF ABSDIF ABSDIF ABSDIF
constant 0.4032*** 0.3938*** 0.4336*** 0.4135*** 0.4120*** 0.3995*** 0.4481***
(6.049) (5.906) (6.368) (9.245) (9.200) (8.848) (4.412)
Log(assets) -
-0.0384*** -0.0365*** -0.0377*** -0.0188*** 0.0182*** -0.0181*** -0.0088
(-5.714) (-5.432) (-5.639) (-4.141) (-4.035) (-4.010) (-1.091)
Log(sales) 0.0235*** 0.0232*** 0.0219*** 0.0085** 0.0083 0.0089** 0.0016
(3.774) (3.734) (3.551) (2.091) (2.049) (2.186) (0.167)
Principle
Ownership -0.0598** -0.0583** -0.0628** -0.0297* -0.0292* -0.0284* -0.0067
(-2.358) (-2.294) (-2.467) (-1.735) (-1.702) (-1.653) (-0.299)
Log(net worth)
-0.0021 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.5905
(-0.402) (-0.340) (-0.352) (-0.046) (-0.009) (-0.034) (-1.187)
Firm Age
-0.0407*** -0.0361*** -0.0401*** -0.0157*** -0.0124** -0.0161*** -0.7165
(-4.785) (-4.100) (-4.706) (-2.722) (-2.087) (-2.786) (-0.856)
College Education 0.0427*** 0.0394*** 0.0393*** 0.0073 0.0060 0.0069 0.0036
(3.114) (2.878) (2.865) (0.796) (0.656) (0.756) (0.271)
Long distance 0.0596*** 0.0162
(3.352) (1.309)
Long relationship
-0.0276* -0.0187** -0.0414***
(-1.944) (-1.971) (-2.844)
One bank -0.0449** 0.0113
(-2.416) (0.923)
N 1729 1729 1729 1729 1729 1729 647
Adjusted 0.048 0.045 0.046 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.018
